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The Dieppe Raid:
Avoidable Disaster or Lesson in Amphibious Assault?

Jennifer Munson
The University of Maine
(Orono, ME)

On August 19th, 1942 Allied forces consisting of mostly Canadian troops mounted a fullscale assault on a small port in Dieppe, France. Prior to this assault, Allied forces had been
forced to withdraw from the western front at Dunkirk in June 1940, which left the eastern front
in Soviet Union territory as the only active front against Germany. By 1941 German forces were
within striking distance of Moscow. 1 This raised many concerns that the Soviet Union might fall
to Hitler's forces. Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, urged Great Britain to reopen the
western front to draw some of the German forces out of Russia and give his soldiers some relief.
This desperate need for assistance led the British military to devise a plan to reclaim territory in
France.
The plan was premature and had many flaws including late tanks, limited air support,
misplaced landing crews and the loss of the element of surprise, which doomed the Canadian
forces. In total, “907 Canadian soldiers were killed, 2,460 were wounded, and 1,946 were taken

Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles: Canada’s Role in Major World Conflicts (Edmonton: Folklore Pub., 2009),
142; N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, August 19th, 1942 (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2001), 6.
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prisoner.” 2 The losses were tremendous. There is a mountain of questions still left unanswered
today. What was the original plan? How was this plan approved? Was it approved through
official military channels? What issues need to be addressed? How did the military react to this
disaster? Was anyone at fault? Who should have been held accountable?
It was determined by the “Combined Operations Headquarter, commanded by British
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,” that a temporary assault on a seaport would display the
Allied powers’ ability to mount a full-scale attack by landing craft from the English Channel. 3
“The idea was for a short, sharp assault on the small French port of Dieppe to encourage the
struggling Soviet Union, to boost morale on the home front, and to provide the bored,
obstreperous Canadians a taste of action.” 4 Up until this point, the Canadian forces had been
stationed in Great Britain along the English Channel to protect against a German raid that would
never happen. 5 With no action yet for the Canadians the home front was beginning to get
anxious. The initial plan was simple, “The Allied forces would seize and hold the town until
sunset, destroy the defences, take prisoners and be safely home on the evening tide.” 6 This did
not work out the way they had planned it.
The plan started out as Operation Rutter. The operation was cancelled abruptly after
months of planning and special training for the Canadians, when the 250 Canadian ships, ready
to attack Dieppe the next day, were discovered by German bombers. This ruined all hopes of

Alex Herd, "Dieppe Raid," The Canadian Encyclopedia, 5. Accessed April 20, 2018,
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/dieppe-raid/.
3 J. L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver, The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History (Don Mills, Ont.:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 148.
4 Bernie Anderson, as quoted in Nightmare of Death: Everything went wrong in the 1942 raid on Dieppe (Canadian
Periodicals Index Quarterly, 2002), 48.
5 N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 5.
6 Bill Twatio, as quoted in The fatal shores of Dieppe: on the 65th anniversary of the landing at Dieppe, one man
who took part in that fateful landing tells his story. (Esprit de Corps, Canadian Periodicals Index Quarterly. 2017),
34.
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maintaining the element of surprise and contributed to Operation Rutter being cancelled. 7 The
final decision to cancel was made due to poor weather conditions on the day of the raid. 8 “While
many in the Allied headquarters wanted to permanently cancel the raid, the new Chief of
Combined Operations—Louis Mountbatten—did not.” 9 The plan was practically unchanged and
renamed Operation Jubilee.
During Operation Rutter, while soldiers were in their ships preparing for the assault, they
were told that Dieppe was the target. When the plan was cancelled and renamed, the target was
not changed. This was a massive security risk. “Normally when an operation is remounted its
destination was changed for security reasons.” 10 With the risk of German spies knowing the
location, it is unclear why it was not changed. If this information had been leaked to the Germans
it would explain the large number of defensive obstacles placed at Dieppe, including concrete
barriers along paths and multiple anti-tank guns. Were these added before Operation Rutter was
planned, or after its location got out? The Canadian Encyclopedia makes it clear that there was a
“need for better intelligence on beach conditions and German defences.” 11 Dieppe was not
thought to be as fortified as it was. Could old intelligence before the location was leaked have
changed this?
A total of “4,963 Canadians, 1,005 British commandos, and 50 U.S Rangers” participated
in Operation Jubilee. 12 However, “Allied commanders knew the raid was risky.” 13 There was a
major push by Canadian Officers to involve the restless Canadian troops who had not yet seen
any action after three years at war. “Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar heard rumours that
Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles, 144.
N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 7.
9 Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles, 144.
10 N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 7.
11 Alex Herd, "Dieppe Raid," The Canadian Encyclopedia, 6.
12 N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 8.
13 Alex Herd, "Dieppe Raid," The Canadian Encyclopedia, 6.
7
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Mountbatten was planning a major raid, he demanded that the British Chiefs of Staff select
Canadians for the task; it would be good for morale, he judged.” 14 It has been speculated that the
troops were not properly prepared and lacked combat experience, causing the plan to fail. While
they did lack the experience, they trained intensely on land and sea tactics for months before the
raid. The Canadian forces were even referred to as, “well trained and more prepared than ever.” 15
The Combined Operation who formulated the plan should be the ones labelled not properly
prepared instead.
The plan was riddled with flaws and failures. Along with the massive security risk, the
entire plan was based on the element of surprise. Not only was this risky, but during the raid, as
they were crossing the English Channel, a group of ships were intercepted by a German convoy.
The interception alerted the enemy on shore, which delayed the raid. Most of the landing craft
reached the beaches late and dropped the troops off in full daylight. 16 Even though the element
of surprise was essentially lost the raid was not called off. Success through supporting of tanks
and navy became the plan.
Terry Copp wrote that the Operation “seems to have been devised by men who believe
that battles could be won by surprise, speed, and shock effect of landing tanks alongside the
infantry.” 17 This plan could have worked better if the tanks had been more successful on the
beaches. First, the tanks were about 10 minutes late. This poor timing set the entire raid back and
left hundreds of men vulnerable. Secondly, “out of the 58 tanks prepared to assist in the raid,
only 29 were able to offload at the shore.” 18 Thirdly, most of the tanks used during the raid got

Granatstein and Oliver, The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History, 148.
Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House of Commons (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1943), 2940.
16 Bernie Anderson, as quoted in Nightmare of Death: Everything went wrong in the 1942 raid on Dieppe, 48.
17 “The Dieppe Raid,” in Terry Copp, A Nation at War: 1939-1945 Essays from Legion Magazine (Stratford,
Ontario, LCMSDS), 35.
18 Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles, 150.
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stuck on the beach almost immediately. “You couldn’t pick worse terrain for a tracked vehicle,
you turn the vehicle a little bit, the stones are rolled into the track, and if you get too many going
through at once you break your track.” 19 This was the unfortunate reality for many tank crews.
Lastly, even the tanks that made it off the beach were eventually stopped by the blockades set up
by the Germans. The tanks were not able to get through and soon became sitting ducks. “Unable
to escape in time, all of the tank crews were either killed or captured.” 20 This error could have
been avoided if the planners had done their research. With the terrain at Dieppe being so unique,
they should have recommended training on similar ground to give a more realistic example of
how the tanks would response in action.
Instead, soldiers trained in England with slightly different terrain. Not only did this affect
the tanks, but it also caused issues with the landing craft. “Boats were scattered all along the
seafront because of smoke, the heavy fire and the currents.” 21 While training for these situations
would have been a difficult task, a systematic order with proper timing of approaching ships
could have made a huge difference. Despite organization being vital for a raid of this size, it was
no practiced.
During the raid, the communication was poor and unreliable. “The faulty communication
system between the beaches, the Royal Air Force, ships, and tanks during the operation had
resulted in a significant number of losses.” 22 Calls for more support, retreat and other commands
were hard to come by after landing. A miscommunication between the troops on shore and the

Allan Glenn as quoted in N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 22.
Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles, 150.
21 Caroline D’Amours, “Training for Operation Jubilee,” Canadian Military History Vol 22, Issue 4 (Autumn
2013):19.
22 Caroline D’Amours, “Training for Operation Jubilee,” 19.
19
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British Royal Marines led to reinforcements being sent to shore. “It was believed the tanks were
progressing well and the
beach was in Canadian hands.” 23 The moment the reinforcements reached the beach they
realized that this report was false. Instead of landing craft coming to pick up those who were still
alive, they dropped more off, only adding to the casualties. Sadly,many soldiers did not make it
onto the beach.
After both groups’ attempts to flank the enemy failed, those on the main beach were
sitting ducks.. Both were supposed to “capture the Headlands” or cliffs “overlooking the Dieppe
Beach” and supply cover for the main assault. 24 With failure on both sides, the main assault did
not stand a chance. The right flank was ill-fated from the start. After being dropped off to begin
their assault they realized they had been dropped at the wrong side of the Scie River. “With no
other way to cross the river, the Canadians were forced to enter the town of Pourville to use the
only available bridge.” 25 This was foreseen by the Germans, who then set up machine guns and
anti-tank artillery to defend the bridge. The South Saskatchewan Regiment’s fate was sealed
after they were dropped in the wrong location.
Prior to the raid, there are multiple examples of unrealistic expectations. Many thought
that the raid would be simple and that casualties would be low. Even though the planners knew
that it was risky, Generals and other military leaders were not prepared for what was to come.
The night before the raid, Major-General J.H. Roberts even stated, “Don’t worry men, it’ll be a
piece of cake.” 26 This was told to the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which “formed the bulk of

N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 24.
N. M. Christie, The Suicide Raid: The Canadians at Dieppe, 17.
25 Norman S. Leach, Canadian Battles, 148.
26 Gerard Gilbert, "The Dieppe Raid: The Forgotten D-Day," The Telegraph, August 17, 2012, , accessed April 23,
2018.
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the infantry assault force.” 27 Whether this was to ease nerves or was a serious statement, it was
inappropriate to lower expectations. His troops needed to be as prepared as they could be,
including knowing that the plan was risky and that giving full effort was needed in order to
succeed.
The final issue to address is the lack of approval. After the failure of the Raid, Churchill
began to seek answers to “when and how formal authorization for the raid was given.” 28 This
question remains unanswered and has since raised more. During a session of the House of
Commons, Mr. Douglas of Weyburn addressed confusion over the commanding roles. He stated,
“We do not know whether it was carried out under General McNaughton as commander of the
Canadian forces overseas, or whether it was under Lord Mountbatten who was in charge of the
combined operation.” 29 It had been months since the raid and the Canadian government still had
no knowledge of formal roles, or who had command of the operation. After reviewing
authorization requirements, it was found that “existing procedures required of Mountbatten were
missing from the archives. Mountbatten himself admitted afterwards that he had no authority to
proceed after the cancellation of Operation Rutter, except on the basis of a new request.” 30 Part
of the process at the time was to submit a full outline of the plan for review, but as stated by
Brian Villa, “It was never done.” With a lack of formal approval, the raid was bound to be full of
flaws. It can be speculated that combined operations “lost” formal approval paperwork to release
them from blame after the raid failed.

27Alex

Herd, "Dieppe Raid," The Canadian Encyclopedia, 1.
Brian Villa and Peter Henshaw, "The Dieppe Raid," The Canadian Historical Review 79, no. 2 (June 1998): 306.
29Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House of Commons. 2790.
30 Brian Villa and Peter Henshaw, "The Dieppe Raid," 307.
28
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Days after the Raid had taken place, the media began claiming it as a heroic victory.
Multiple newspapers used headlines like, “Daring Raid”, 31 “Blazing Battle”, 32 and “Allies
Smash Nazi Defences”. 33 All of these were misleading and prompted a false hope in the war
effort at home. In reality, most of the German defenses remained intact and questions about the
endless flaws had already begun to be raised. While the raid did slightly weaken the German air
force and led them to move more forces and planes away from the Soviet Union, it still did not
make up for the avoidable casualties and issues.
After the Dieppe Raid failed, research began immediately to determine why and who was
responsible. To this day, theories and speculations consume many historians who have dug into
the vast amount of first-person accounts, newspapers, government documents and other research
papers. Thousands have been affected by this disaster, and many are still emotional about the
outcome. Alan Saunders, a veteran who fought in the Dieppe raid, stated that, “I think it was one
of the biggest cock-ups of the Second World War and it never should have happened.’ His view
was that it was a costly lesson, and crass stupidity to think that by frontal assault you could take
an enemy-held port.” 34 While many were upset and even angry at those who put Operation
Jubilee into action, there were some who did not share those feelings.
Shortly after the war, the Dieppe Raid became referred to as the dress rehearsal for the
invasion of Normandy beach. Although there was a 67 percent casualty rate at Dieppe, many
claimed that multiple valuable lessons were learned. 35 “Dieppe was a lesson on how not to
mount an amphibious assault.” 36 The Allied forces learned that in order to attack a coastal port,

"Details of Daring Raid," The Halifax Herald, August 21, 1942, 67th ed., sec. 200. 1.
"Details of Daring Raid," The Halifax Herald, 7.
33 "Allies Smash German Defenses," The Halifax Herald, August 20, 1942, 67th ed., sec. 199. 1.
34 Alan Saunders. As quoted in “The Dieppe Raid: The forgotten D-Day.”
35 Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House of Commons. 2940.
36 J. L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver, The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History, 152.
31
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tanks and the element of surprise were not enough. The coast of occupied Europe during WWII
became heavily fortified by the Germans who were expecting an invasion on the Western front.
The tall cliffs along the coast of France made the German defenses even stronger. It was clear
that if the Allies had any hopes of reopening the Western front, an attack by sea would
eventually be necessary. The Allies learned that better intelligence of terrain and military
defenses, along with proper communication and planning, was vital. How to make use of tanks
also came into question. With such difficult terrain, specialized landing craft and tanks would be
needed. 37
After all, Dieppe was only a raid. The entire goal of it was to display power and gain
intelligence on performing a synchronized sea/land assault. While the casualties were
tremendous, it did allow for vital gains in intelligence and brought the enemy’s focus towards the
Western front to help relieve the Russians as much as possible. Both sides of the Dieppe raid
debate make good points, but the flaws that surround the raid could have been avoided. With
proper planning, approval, and intelligence, the casualty rate could have been drastically lower.
Instead of calling for early retirement or demotions of those in charge of the raid, the Canadian
and British militaries gave out promotions and medals. Was the Dieppe Raid a failure or a
success? That is still a hard question to answer.
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Jennifer Munson is an undergraduate history student at the University of Maine.
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